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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating
to oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 1, 2010,
through October 31, 2012, with emphasis on cases decided in the
past year. The cases examined include decisions of state and federal
courts in the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES
State v. Cemex Construction Materials South, L.L.C. 2 held that all de-
* Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included. Page limitations of this publication required the omission of some cases of
interest.
2. State v. Cemex Constr. Materials S., L.L.C., 350 S.W.3d 396, 410 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 2011, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.). For other notable cases dealing with title
and conveyancing issues, see ConocoPhillips Co. v. Dahlberg, No. C-10-285, 2011 WL
710604 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2011) (legal description); Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc., 374
S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2012, no. pet.) (fractional deed construction); Farm &
Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2012, pet. denied) (deed restrictions as a mineral reservation); Philipello v. Taylor, No. 10-
11-00014-CV, 2012 WL 1435171 (Tex. App.-Waco Apr. 25, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(Duhig Rule and surrounding circumstances); Hunsaker v. Brown Distribut. Co., 373
S.W.3d 153 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (fractional conveyance of land
described); Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2012, pet. denied) (frac-
tion of royalty deed); Harrington v. Magellan Pipeline Co., L.P., No. 10-09-00131-CV, 2011
WL 6225276 (Tex. App.-Waco Dec. 14, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (multiple pipelines on
single easement); Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2011, pet. denied) (fraction of royalty deed reservation); Philipello v. Nelson Family
Farming Trust, 349 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (pro-
portionate reduction of reserved royalty); Fisher v. Wynn, No. 12-11-00008-CV, 2011 WL
3338771 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (subject to clause not a sec-
ond grant); Elder v. Anadarko E & P Co., No. 12-10-00250-CV, 2011 WL 2713817 (Tex.
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posits of granite, limestone, gravel, sand, and any other mineral sub-
stances of whatever kind or character having commercial value on public
school lands are reserved to the State of Texas if they were originally
conveyed pursuant to the Mining Act of 1895. Four parcels (Section 22
and Surveys 271, 221, and 222) in El Paso County were set apart for the
benefit of public schools. The State originally conveyed the four parcels
in 1900, 1906, and 1912 to the predecessors of Cemex Construction
Materials South, L.L.C. (Cemex). All four parcels were classified as dry
grazing mineral land. Section 22 was conveyed with no mineral reserva-
tion. Surveys 271, 221, and 222 were conveyed with a reservation of 1/16
of the minerals. The State alleged that the State owned title to all miner-
als under the 1895 Land Sales Act and Title LXXI of the Mining Act of
1895. Cemex alleged that dirt, caliche, sand, gravel, limestone, and the
other materials at issue were not "minerals" reserved to the State.
The parcels were designated as public school lands, and the law in exis-
tence at the time of the original conveyances applied to their sales.3 At
the time of the original conveyances, the Land Sales Act of 1895 and the
Mining Act of 1895 were in effect. The Mining Act of 1895 stated that
public school lands designated as containing valuable mineral deposits
had to be purchased "'under regulations prescribed by law. . . .' "4 All
sales of public school lands were subject to a reservation of the mineral
estate.5
In analyzing and applying the law outlined above, the El Paso Court of
Appeals looked to Schwarz v. State6 for guidance.7 Schwarz also involved
land designated as containing minerals that was sold pursuant to the Land
Sales Act of 1895.8 There, the original conveyance by the State was sub-
ject to a reservation of the mineral estate. Over forty years after the origi-
nal conveyance, the State again provided notice of the mineral estate
reservation to the landowners by way of letters patent. After another
thirty-one years passed, the landowners executed a lease for the extrac-
tion of coal and lignite. The leaseholder, Schwarz, later sought a declara-
tion that he owned the minerals he had extracted pursuant to the lease.
Looking at the law in effect at the time of the original conveyance, the
App.-Tyler July 13, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rules of construction for deeds); Her-
nandez v. El Paso Prod. Co., No. 13-09-184-CV, 2011 WL 1442991 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi Apr. 14, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (inconsistent fractions in deed); Gail v.
Berry, 343 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2011, pet. denied) (reformation of deed for
mutual mistake); Carpenter v. Phelps, 391 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2011, no pet.) (legal description); Walker v. Campuzano Enters., Ltd., No. 02-10-00061-CV,
2011 WL 945167 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Mar. 17, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Duhig Rule);
Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (inconsis-
tent fractions in deed).
3. Cemex Constr. Materials S., L.L.C., 350 S.W.3d at 401.
4. Id. at 402 (quoting Act of April 30th, 1895, 24th Leg., R.S., ch. 127, § 1, 1895 Tex.
Gen. Laws 197 (repealed 1913)).
5. Id. at 403 (citing Tynes v. Mauro, 860 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993,
pet. denied)).
6. Schwarz v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986).
7. Cemex Constr. Materials S., L.L.C., 350 S.W.3d at 403-05.
8. Id. at 404 (citing Schwarz, 703 S.W.2d at 188).
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Supreme Court of Texas determined that the State retained the mineral
estate. 9 Further, clarifying the extent of the mineral estate reserved by
the State, the Schwarz court held that "whatever is not unequivocally
granted in clear and explicit terms is withheld and any ambiguity or ob-
scurity in the terms of the statute, such as the term 'the minerals,' must be
interpreted in favor of the State."10
The court in Cemex also determined that the State had reserved the
minerals embraced by the Mineral Act of 1895.11 In addition to the statu-
tory mandate that only the surface estate of the four public school land
parcels be sold, the court pointed out acknowledgement of the mineral
estate reservations in the required affidavits and applications filed by the
original grantees as part of either the original conveyance or the second
conveyance. The court held that, pursuant to Schwarz, because the State
did not unequivocally grant to the purchaser anything other than the sur-
face estate, no minerals were conveyed. 12 The court then addressed
Cemex's argument that dirt, caliche, sand, gravel, limestone, and other
materials were not "minerals" that the State had reserved. Relying again
on Schwarz, the court held that, because none of the materials to which
Cemex claimed ownership were clearly granted by the State in the origi-
nal conveyance, those items were withheld from the State's conveyances,
and any ambiguity in the terms of the statute had to be resolved in the
State's favor.13 The possible ambiguities included such terms as "the min-
erals," "stones valuable for ornamental or building purposes," and "other
valuable building material." 14 The specific holding was that the State re-
served "all deposits of granite, limestone, gravel, sand, and any other
mineral substances of whatever kind or character having commercial
value .... ."15
The significance of the case is that the holdings disregarded the effect
of express reservations of 1/16 of the minerals or no reservations of the
minerals thereby reserving all minerals to the State, and that the court
construed all ambiguities within the meaning of "minerals" under the
statute against the grantee.
The Texas Supreme Court's order of March 16, 2012, states:
PETITION FOR REVIEW IS GRANTED.
First and second amended agreed motions to dismiss petition for re-
view granted as follows:
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.3, without
hearing oral argument or considering the merits, the Court
grants the petition for review, vacates the court of appeals' judg-
ment, and remands the case to the trial court for rendition of
9. Id. at 404-05 (summarizing Schwarz, 703 S.W.2d at 189).
10. Id. at 404 (quoting Schwarz, 703 S.W.2d at 189).
11. Id. at 406-08.
12. Id. at 408.
13. Id. at 408-09.
14. Id. at 409.
15. Id. at 410.
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judgment pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement.16
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.3 states:
If a case is settled by agreement of the parties and the parties so
move, the Supreme Court may grant the petition if it has not already
been granted and, without hearing argument or considering the mer-
its, render a judgment to effectuate the agreement. The Supreme
Court's action may include setting aside the judgment of the court of
appeals or the trial court without regard to the merits and remanding
the case to the trial court for rendition of a judgment in accordance
with the agreement. The Supreme Court may abate the case until the
lower court's proceedings to effectuate the agreement are complete.
A severable portion of the proceeding may be disposed of if it will
not prejudice the remaining parties. In any event, the Supreme
Court's order does not vacate the court of appeals' opinion unless
the order specifically provides otherwise. An agreement or motion
cannot be conditioned on vacating the court of appeals' opinion.'7
The Supreme Court of Texas adopted the above procedure in order to
preserve the public nature of an appellate court's opinion while allowing
parties to settle their disputes during the pendency of an appeal.18 Upon
joint motion, the Texas Supreme Court grants the petition
without reference to the merits, sets aside the judgments of the court
of appeals and trial court without reference to the merits and re-
mands the cause to the trial court for entry of judgment in accor-
dance with the settlement agreement of the parties-the court of
appeals' opinion is not vacated. Although the application for [peti-
tion] is granted, the precedential authority of a court of appeals opin-
ion which is not vacated under these circumstances is equivalent to a
"[pet.] dismissed" case.19
Here, the Texas Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's judgment
without considering the merits and did not expressly vacate the opinion. 20
Therefore, the El Paso Court of Appeal's opinion in State v. Cemex21 has
the same precedential authority of a case where the petition was
dismissed.
MPH Production Co. v. Smith22 held that a right of first refusal to
purchase minerals was a covenant running with the land, and it was at-
tached to and conveyed with the surface estate. The parties aligned as
successors-in-interest to Grantor and Grantee under a deed executed in
16. Cemex Constr. Materials S., L.L.C. v. State, No. 11-0790, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 231, at
*1 (Tex. Mar. 16, 2012).
17. Tex. R. App. P. 56.3 (emphasis added).




21. State v. Cemex Constr. Materials S., L.L.C., 350 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2011, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
22. MPH Prod. Co. v. Smith, No. 06-11-00085-CV, 2012 WL 1813467, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana May 18, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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1979, which covered 18.620 acres in Harrison County. Grantor conveyed
the surface estate and a right of first refusal to buy the minerals in the
land (ROFR) to Grantee. The issue was whether the successors to
Grantee acquired the ROFR either (1) as a covenant running with the
land, or (2) as part of the rights transferred by the assignments of the
surface estate to them.23
In Texas, a real property covenant runs with the land when it touches
and concerns the land, it relates to a thing in existence or specifically
binds the parties and their assigns, it is intended by the parties to run
with the land, and the successor to the burden has notice.24
Privity of estate between the parties is also required.25 In this case, only
privity of estate and the intent of the parties were in dispute.
"Privity of estate exists when there is a mutual or successive relation-
ship to the same rights of property." 26 Two separate estates were created
when Grantor reserved the mineral estate subject to the ROFR. Grantor
argued there was no privity of estate because the 1979 deed only con-
veyed the surface interest, and therefore, there was no simultaneous or
successive interest in the mineral estate between Grantor and Grantee.
The court held there was privity of estate even though the 1979 deed
created two separate estates because the mineral estate owned by Gran-
tor became burdened with the obligation represented by the ROFR.2 7
The parties disputed whether the deed expressed sufficient intent for
the ROFR to run with the land. "In order for a covenant to run with the
land, the parties who created the covenant must intend for it to do S0."28
The deed states:
And for the same consideration, we have granted, and do grant, to
the Grantees the right, privilege and option of purchasing the oil, gas
and other minerals, or any portion thereof, in and under the above
described land, for such sum as we may be willing to accept upon our
receipt of a bona fide offer from any third party (being any party
other than one of the Grantors); and upon the receipt by either of
the Grantors of an offer to purchase a Grantor's interest in oil, gas
and other minerals, or any portion thereof, which said Grantor
desires to accept, the Grantor receiving such offer shall notify the
Grantees of such offer and the terms thereof, and such Grantor's
willingness to accept such offer, and the Grantees shall have the right
and privilege of purchasing the interest of said Grantor in the oil, gas
and other minerals of the price and upon the terms and conditions
therein stated, at any time within twenty days after the Grantees re-
23. Id.





28. Id. at *3 (citing Rolling Lands Invs., L.C. v. Nw. Airport Mgmt., L.P., 111 S.W.3d
187, 200 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)).
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ceive such notice from said Grantor. 29
Immediately after the right of first refusal was the following language:
"The right, privilege and option herein granted shall be binding
upon the Grantors, and their respective heirs and assigns. No sale of
an interest in oil, gas and other minerals may be made by a Grantor
without complying with the provisions set out herein."30
The habendum clause contained general warranty language that
Grantee relied on to support Grantee's argument that the parties in-
tended the right to pass to Grantee's successors in title. The court
analyzed the language of the 1979 deed and concluded that the
ROFR was a covenant running with the land.3'
Finally, the court also held (but with more conviction) that, because the
subsequent deeds out of the Grantee in 1981 conveyed the fee subject to
any mineral reservations, these deeds conveyed the surface and the
ROFR, which was a right connected to the ownership of the surface.32 In
other words, regardless of whether the ROFR was a covenant running
with the land, the ROFR was a part of the surface estate expressly as-
signed to Grantee's successors. "[I]t is a stretch to read into the subtleties
of the deed's text an intent to make the right of first refusal a personal
right only." 33
The significance of the case is the conclusion that it is unlikely that a
ROFR is a personal right only, and therefore: (1) it will be included in the
property rights of the estate to which the ROFR is first attached, and
(2) it will be included in any subsequent conveyance unless excepted. The
analysis of the deed in this case suggests that a ROFR will generally be
construed as a covenant running with the land.
III. LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES
Shell Oil Co. v. Ross3 4 held that neither the doctrine of fraudulent con-
29. Id.
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id. at *5-6.
32. Id. at *6.
33. Id.
34. Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. 2011). For other notable cases
dealing with lease and leasing issues, see PEC Minerals LP v. Chevron USA Inc., 439 F.
App'x 413 (5th Cir. 2011) (production anywhere on lease holds multiple tracts/units); Coll
v. Abaco Operating LLC, No. 2:08-CV-345-TJW, 2011 WL 1831748 (E.D. Tex. May 12,
2011) (severance tax); Thomson Oil Royalty, LLC v. Graham, 351 S.W.3d 162 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2011), aff'd, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7842 (Tex. 2011) (ratification of voidable
lease by paying bonus); Glencrest Res., LLC v. Ellis, No. 02-12-00060-CV, 2012 WL
3500324 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 16, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (urban lease class
action); Samson Lone Star, Ltd. P'ship v. Hooks, 389 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (lease offset clause; TRC records; unpooling); SM Energy Co. v.
Sutton, 376 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (termination of ORRI
on partial release of lease); Kantner v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 02-11-00378-CV, et
al., 2012 WL 1859873 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 10, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (ur-
ban lease and homeowners association); E. Express, L.P. v. XTO Energy, Inc., Nos.
02-10-00395-CV, 02-10--00396-CV, 02-10-00397-CV, 2012 WL 1059080 (Tex. App.-
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cealment nor the discovery rule will toll the statute of limitations when
readily accessible, publicly available information would reveal a cause of
action for underpayment of lease royalties. In 1961, Lessor leased to
Lessee for a royalty on gas equal to "one-eighth of the amount realized"
by Lessee.35 Part of the leased land was pooled into two pooled units.
One producing well was drilled on each of the pooled units, and two pro-
ducing wells were drilled on the leased land. The unit wells were on state
lands, and the royalty was proportionately reduced. From 1988 to 1994,
Lessee computed the royalty on the unit wells on the basis of a weighted-
average of third-party sales prices for sales from the pooled units by
Lessee and other operators. Lessee, however, could provide no explana-
tion for the basis of royalty computations on the lease wells from 1994 to
1997. The parties aligned as Lessor and Lessee, and Lessor sued Lessee in
2002 for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud. Lessee con-
ceded that Lessor was entitled to damages but asserted a statute of limita-
tions defense. Lessor countered that Lessee had "'set up an elaborate
scheme to allow it to [underpay] royalties, and then made multiple mis-
representations to cover up this scheme, [including] making false repre-
sentations in the monthly [royalty] statements.' 3 6 Lessor secured a jury
finding on fraudulent concealment. 37
The issues before the Texas Supreme Court were (1) whether the stat-
ute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment,
and (2) whether the discovery rule delayed the accrual of the cause of
action. The supreme court stated that fraudulent concealment requires
that the party asserting it demonstrate that the party committing the
fraud "'actually knew a wrong occurred, had a fixed purpose to conceal
the wrong, and did conceal the wrong." 38 However, the doctrine only
applies until "'the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered with
reasonable diligence." 39
The supreme court's opinion focused almost exclusively on the second
element of the test, namely whether the fraud could have been discov-
ered with reasonable diligence. Lessor argued that reasonable reliance on
Lessee's misrepresentations negated its duty to engage in due diligence.
Fort Worth Mar. 29, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (urban lease and homeowners associa-
tion); Maddox v. Vantage Energy, LLC, 361 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet.
denied) (urban lease and homeowners association); Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon En-
ergy Prod. Co., 359 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (lease covering
land in two counties as notice); Royalco Oil & Gas Corp. v. Stockhome Trading Corp., 361
S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (salt water disposal lease is not a min-
eral lease); EOG Resources, Inc. v. Hurt, 357 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011,
pet. denied) (damages to Lessor's tenant as third party beneficiary of oil and gas lease);
Pharaoh Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ranchero Esperanza, Ltd., 343 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2011, no pet.) (surface use and temporary injunction); Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., No.
10-09-00276-CV, 2011 WL 1901987 (Tex. App.-Waco May 11, 2011, pet. granted) (mem.
op.) (accommodation doctrine).
35. Ross, 356 S.W.3d at 926.
36. Id. (alterations in original).
37. Id. at 927.
38. Id. (quoting Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 841 (Tex. 2001)).
39. Id. (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 67 (Tex. 2011)).
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The supreme court rejected this argument, stating that the duty of dili-
gence was triggered once Lessor was "'put on notice of the alleged harm
of injury-causing actions."' 40 In this case, there was a large disparity in
the price received from production on the lease wells and from produc-
tion on the unit wells. The supreme court reasoned that, because the wells
were in a common reservoir, the disparity in prices should have alerted
Lessor about a potential wrongdoing by Lessee, thus triggering the duty
of diligence. Lessor argued that the disparity in prices could have been
attributed to differences in heating values, but the court rejected this ar-
gument, stating that a hypothetical, albeit reasonable, explanation for a
suspicious royalty payment does not relieve a royalty owner of the duty
to investigate.41
According to the supreme court, the duty of reasonable diligence re-
quires that property owners "make themselves aware of relevant infor-
mation available in the public record." 42 Accordingly, "[Lessor] did not
exercise reasonable diligence and [Lessor's] claims are barred by limita-
tions if readily accessible and publicly available information could have
revealed [Lessee's] wrongdoing before the limitations period expired." 43
In this case, the fraud could have been discovered by reference to the El
Paso Permian Basin Index or the Texas General Land Office Records.
Both of these resources were publicly available, and reference to either of
them would have revealed that Lessee was underpaying the royalty.44 Ac-
cordingly, the supreme court held that, as a matter of law, Lessor had not
exercised reasonable diligence, and the doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
ment did not apply.45
The supreme court then turned to the issue of whether the discovery
rule could be applied to delay the accrual of the cause of action. The
supreme court characterized the discovery rule as a "'very limited excep-
tion to the statutes of limitations."' 4 6 Moreover, the rule applies "'only
when the nature of the plaintiff's injury is both inherently undiscoverable
and objectively verifiable."' 4 7 An injury is inherently undiscoverable
when it is "'unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations
period despite due diligence." 48 The supreme court stated again that
Lessor had not exercised due diligence. 49 Accordingly, the discovery rule
did not apply.
40. Id. at 928 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 207
(Tex. 2011)).
41. Id. at 929 (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex.
2001)).
42. Id. at 928.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 929.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 929 (quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455
(Tex. 1994)).
47. Id. at 930 (quoting Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex.
2001)).
48. Id. (quoting S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1996)).
49. Id.
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The case is a continuation of a pronounced trend at the supreme court
to enforce statutes of limitation, to require that injured parties take rea-
sonable steps to be informed and to take prompt action to assert their
claims, and to narrow the application of fraudulent concealment and the
discovery rule in extending a statute of limitations.
Jones v. Clem5o held that the only lessee entitled to notice under the
change in ownership clause of a lease is the lessee at the time the change
in ownership occurs. The facts as summarized in the opinion are not en-
tirely clear. Evans owned a mineral interest that was leased for oil and
gas. In 1991, Clem acquired Evans's interest through a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, and Clem recorded the deed in the Coleman County Clerk's of-
fice. Although Clem gave no notice of assignment to anyone, Clem
immediately began receiving royalty payments from the purchaser, West-
ern Gas. In 1999, for some reason, payments to Clem stopped. In 2002,
someone assigned the lease on Clem's interest to Jones. Jones received
some document (possibly a paydeck) from a predecessor lessee that
showed Evans as the owner. When Jones tried to pay Evans, Jones dis-
covered that Evans had died, and Jones then began paying Evans's
daughter. In 2008, Clem discovered that the lease was still producing and
sued Jones and Evans's daughter for unpaid royalties. Judgment was en-
tered for Clem against Jones for $27,169.38 and against Evans's daughter
for $11,376.15. Judgment was entered for Jones against Evans's daughter
for $27,169.38. There is no explanation as to the reason for the splits in
liability, and Evans's daughter did not appeal.51 Jones relied upon the
change of ownership clause in the lease as an affirmative defense.52
The change of ownership clause relied upon by Jones was a typical
lease clause. It expressly permitted assignments but expressly limited
lessee's obligations in part as follows:
No such change or division in the ownership of the land, rentals or
royalties shall be binding upon lessee for any purpose until such per-
son acquiring any interest has furnished lessee with the instrument or
instruments, or certified copies thereof, constituting his chain of title
from the original lessor.53
These clauses "relieve a lessee from liability for the mispayment of roy-
alty or delay rentals, when the mispayment is caused by a change in own-
ership and no notice is given to the lessee of such change." 54 "Where such
a provision is included in the lease, the lessee is not charged with con-
structive notice from the record of a subsequent transfer by the lessor."55
50. Jones v. Clem, No. 11-10-00123-CV, 2012 WL 1069168, at *4 (Tex. App.-Eastland
Mar. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
51. Id. at *1-2.
52. Id. at *2.
53. Id. at *3.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing Jackson v. United Producers' Pipe Line Co., 33 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Civ.




The opinion identifies Western Gas as the "purchaser" 56 and as the
"lessee"57 at the time Clem first acquired the interest, so the capacity in
which Western Gas acted is not clear. Nevertheless, Clem apparently con-
ceded that Western Gas was the lessee at the time and could have in-
voked the clause against Clem. The opinion is silent as to whether Jones
made the same concession. The court then assumed a waiver of the
change in ownership notice by Western Gas based on the payments made
by Western Gas. Obviously, if Western Gas was only the purchaser, and
not the lessee, payments by Western Gas would not necessarily be a
waiver of the change in ownership clause in the lease.
The Eastland Court of Appeals held that Jones was not entitled to no-
tice under the change of ownership clause because it applies only when
there has been a change or division of ownership during the lease term,
and there was no such change during Jones's "tenure" as lessee.58 How-
ever, the lease did not say anything about a change during any particular
lessee's "tenure," only that the lessor must give notice to the lessee. Per-
haps the court is relying upon the presumed waiver by Western Gas; per-
haps the court actually means that only changes during the "tenure" of a
particular lessee trigger the protection of the change of ownership clause.
The court commented that Jones could have examined the record or ob-
tained a title opinion, but of course, avoiding that obligation is exactly
why a change of ownership clause is included in a lease. The lessee can
obtain a title opinion, put division orders in place, rely on the change of
ownership provision, maintain a lease file with any transfer of ownership
notice received, and never examine title again.
Here, the court relied on the doctrine of constructive notice. Jones was
charged with constructive notice because the deed to Clem was on file
when Jones took the leasehold interest. 59 The filing of the deed was no-
tice to all persons, and "[t]he doctrine of constructive notice creates an
irrebuttable presumption of actual notice" in certain situations.60
Jones also tried to rely on a "division order" document that was un-
signed by Clem, which also had a disclaimer of any warranty that it re-
flected the correct title.6 1 The opinion was unclear about the exact nature
of this document, but it was clearly not a division order, and we can only
assume that it was some kind of paydeck.
Because there is so little precedent on the change in ownership clause,
the case could be significant, but the facts are so unclear that it is difficult
to analyze. A holding that the change of ownership clause is only trig-
gered by a change that occurs during the "tenure" of a particular lessee
seems unsupportable. Given that properties are frequently sold today
without a title opinion and often with very poor (or no) lease files, the
56. Id. at *1.
57. Id. at *3.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *4.
60. Id. (citing HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Tex. 1998)).
61. Id.
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allocation of risks in the purchase and sale agreement becomes very im-
portant. Allocating risk based on the effective date of a sale may not be
effective to limit a purchaser's risk because a purchaser could pay the
wrong party going forward, just as Jones did in this case.
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS
Tawes v. Barnes62 held that a lessor of lands included within a Joint
Operating Agreement (JOA) had no right to sue under the JOA, either
as a third-party beneficiary of the JOA or by virtue of having privity of
estate. Two adjacent tracts of land were leased by landowners Barnes and
Baker. Thereafter, the Barnes Lease and the Baker Lease were pooled
into a single unit. The working interest owners in the unit entered into a
Working Interest Unit Agreement (WIUA) and an attached JOA.6 3
Moose, a non-operator and one of the lessees under the Baker Lease,
proposed drilling two additional wells in the pooled unit under the terms
of the JOA. The operator, who was the lessee under the Barnes Lease,
elected to go non-consent. Moose, Tawes, and various other non-opera-
tors who owned the lessee's interest under the Baker Lease drilled the
wells. Moose acted as operator for the consenting parties in drilling the
wells. Tawes and another company later acquired Moose's working inter-
est in the Baker Lease and the wells in a foreclosure sale. At issue in this
case was Tawes's liability, as a consenting party, for the payment of roy-
alty to Barnes under the provisions of the WIUA and JOA.6 4
The JOA in Article VI.B2 provided that "[t]he entire cost and risk of
conducting such operations shall be borne by the Consenting Parties in
the proportions they have elected to bear."65 In a subsequent portion of
Article VI, the JOA provided that
[d]uring the period of time Consenting Parties are entitled to receive
Non-Consenting Party's share of production, or the proceeds there-
from, Consenting Parties shall be responsible for the payment of all
production, severance, excise, gathering and other taxes, and all roy-
alty, overriding royalty and other burdens applicable to Non-Con-
senting Party's share of production.66
62. Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419, 428-29, 451 (Tex. 2011). For other notable cases
dealing with industry contracts, see Chesapeake Operating, Inc. v. Sanchez Oil & Gas
Corp., CIV.A. H-11-1890, 2012 WL 2133554 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2012) (exculpatory clause
under 1977 and 1982 M.F.O.A); Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d
177 (Tex. 2012) (fraud based on concealment of payout); Sonerra Res. Corp. v. Helmerich
& Payne Int'l Drilling Co., No. 01-11-00459-CV, 2012 WL 3776428 (Tex. App.-Houston.
[1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (indemnity under drilling contract); Long
v. Rim Operating, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2011, pet. denied) (enforce-
ability of JOA blackout provision); Aurora Petroleum, Inc. v. Cholla Petroleum Inc., No.
07-10-0035-CV, 2011 WL 652843 (Tex. App--Amarillo Feb. 23, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(FOA unenforceable without test well site).
63. Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 421.
64. Id. at 424-25.
65. Id. at 422.
66. Id. at 423.
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The Texas Supreme Court called this the "Royalty Provision" for
identification.67
The JOA in this case was similar to most JOAs because it allocated all
costs and expenses, along with the sharing of revenue, in accordance with
an allocation based on the interests owned by the working interest own-
ers. However, the Royalty Provision recited that "Consenting Parties
shall be responsible for the payment of . .. all royalty," language that was
arguably consistent with either joint or several liability for royalty pay-
ments between and among the Consenting Parties.68
Barnes asserted that Tawes, as a Consenting Party, was liable for all
royalty owed to her, and she asserted that she had standing to sue under
the Royalty Provision as a third-party beneficiary of the JOA. Alterna-
tively, Barnes argued that she could recover against Tawes for the pay-
ment of royalty because they were in privity of estate. The federal courts
found Tawes to be liable and responsible for all royalty, and the matter
arrived at the Texas Supreme Court by way of certified questions from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.69
The supreme court considered the following certified question as one
of three questions submitted:
1. Does Barnes have any right [to] enforce the [Dominion-Moose
Agreements]-the WIUA and JOA-between Dominion, Moose ...
and the Moose Assignees, including Tawes, to recover unpaid royal-
ties, between the date of first production and February 2002, of
Baker-Barnes Nos. 1 & 2 wells under what we have called the "Roy-
alty Provision" of the JOA, either as a third-party beneficiary of the
WIUA and JOA or by virtue of having privity of estate with
Tawes? 70
Answering the foregoing question, the supreme court first held that
Barnes was not a third-party beneficiary.71 "A third party may enforce a
contract it did not sign when the parties to the contract entered the agree-
ment with the clear and express intention of directly benefitting the third
party. When the contract confers only an indirect, incidental benefit, a
third party cannot enforce the contract." 72 The language of the contract
must be clear, and the intent of the contracting parties controls. "Tradi-
tionally, Texas courts have maintained a presumption against third-party
beneficiary agreements." 73 "Therefore, in the absence of a clear and une-
quivocal expression of the contracting parties' intent to directly benefit a
third party, courts will not confer third-party beneficiary status by
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 424.
70. Id. (alteration and ellipses in original).
71. Id. at 426.
72. Id. at 425 (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Tex. Util. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651
(Tex. 1999)).
73. Id. (citing Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Smith, 525 S.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Tex.
1975)).
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implication."7 4
Here, Dominion and Moose did not express a clear intent to directly
benefit Barnes, and any benefit received by her was merely incidental.75
JOAs are "contract[s] typical to the oil and gas industry whose func-
tion is to designate an operator, describe the scope of the operator's
authority, provide for the allocation of costs and production among
the parties to the agreement, and provide for recourse among the
parties if one or more default in their obligations." 7 6
The supreme court deduced "from the oil and gas industry's customary
purpose for using JOAs, and from the plain language of the JOA at issue
here, that neither Dominion nor Moose included the JOA Royalty Provi-
sion with the intention of directly benefitting any lessor of a Baker Unit
lease."77
We do not find it determinative that the 1982 version of the AAPL's
Model Form JOA used here does not expressly waive third-party lia-
bility like the contract at issue in MCI . . .. Instead, the controlling
factor is the absence of any sufficiently clear and unequivocal lan-
guage demonstrating an intent to directly benefit Barnes or any
other would-be beneficiary of the contract.78
Accordingly, Barnes was not a third-party beneficiary to the JOA.
Barnes argued that, even if she was not a third-party beneficiary, she
could recover against Tawes for the payment of royalty because they were
in privity of estate. "'Liability to . . . [a] lessor for the payment of rent or
the performance of other lease covenants may arise from either privity of
contract or privity of estate.'" 79 Barnes asserted that Tawes came into
privity of estate with her when Tawes undertook the obligation to pay
royalty under the Barnes Lease. This argument is apparently based on the
reasoning that the original lessee had to pay royalty to Barnes, Moose
agreed to pay the royalty owed by the original lessee pursuant to the
JOA, Tawes acquired Moose's interest, and therefore Tawes must pay
Barnes.
"[W]hen privity of estate exists between an assignee of an oil and gas
lessee's entire leasehold interest and the original oil and gas lessor, the
assignee must pay the lessor's royalties as required by the oil and gas
lease."80 However, Tawes's interest in the Barnes Lease was derived from
the JOA and WIUA, and Tawes's interest in the Baker-Barnes Wells No.
1 and No. 2 became possessory when the operator of the Barnes Lease
went non-consent. Article III.B of the JOA expressly provided that
74. Id. (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp., 995 S.W.2d at 651).
75. Id. at 428-29.
76. Id. at 426 (quoting Seagull Energy E&P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d
342, 345 (Tex. 2006)) (internal citations omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 428.
79. Id. at 429 (alterations in original) (quoting Amco Trust Inc. v. Naylor, 317 S.W.2d




"[n]othing contained in this [contract] shall be deemed an assignment or
cross-assignment of interests covered hereby."8 Moreover, the JOA pro-
vided the methodology used to calculate the period of time the con-
senting parties are granted temporary ownership of the non-consenting
parties' share of production. This time period is of a limited duration, and
the non-consenting parties' share of production will revert back to the
non-consenting parties at the end of the time period.82 "Therefore, the
terms of the Dominion-Moose Agreements make clear that by opting to
go non-consent as to the Baker-Barnes Wells No. 1 and No. 2, Dominion
did not assign its interest as Barnes's lessee to Tawes or any other con-
senting party."83 Instead, Dominion retained a reversionary interest in
the non-consent wells. Tawes, as a consenting party, received no perma-
nent interest in the Barnes Lease. Accordingly, privity of estate did not
exist between Barnes and Tawes.
In response to the Fifth Circuit's first certified question, the Texas Su-
preme Court held "that Barnes ha[d] no right to enforce the Domin-
ion-Moose Agreements as a third-party beneficiary or by way of privity
of estate." 84 The other two certified questions were only applicable in the
event that Barnes could enforce the Dominion-Moose Agreements. Ac-
cordingly, because Barnes could not enforce the Agreements, the su-
preme court did not address the following two certified questions:
2. If Barnes may enforce the [Dominion-Moose Agreements], does
the WIUA prevent Barnes from recovering from Tawes? ...
3. If Tawes, as a Consenting Party, is responsible for royalties under
the JOA, does the JOA Royalty Provision change the agreement
within the JOA such that Tawes is responsible for all of Barnes'[s]
unpaid royalty jointly and severally, or does the JOA limit Tawes'[s]
liability for unpaid royalty to the extent of his interest in the two
wells at issue between the date of first production and February
2002?85
This case is significant because it does not open the door for lessors to
assert that they are third-party beneficiaries under this common form
JOA. There are many terms and provisions in a typical JOA that arguably
could tie back to implied or express lease covenants. While there is no
doubt that no one in the industry has actually intended that result, except
in the most unusual of documents, if the Texas Supreme Court had read
that intent into this form JOA, then the unintended consequence of the
use of the forms would have been to significantly increase the risk of
liability for working interest owners.
Reeder v. Wood County Energy, L.L.C. 86 held that the gross negligence
or willful misconduct exculpatory clause in the 1989 Model Form Operat-
81. Id. (alterations in original).
82. Id. at 429-30.
83. Id. at 430.
84. Id. at 431.
85. Id. at 431, 424-25 (alterations in original).
86. Reeder v. Wood Cnty. Energy, L.L.C., 395 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2012).
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ing Agreement applied to breach of contract claims, but in this case, there
was insufficient evidence to support a finding against the operator.
Reeder became the "Operator"87 of a property subject to a JOA modeled
after the 1989 Model Form JOA.8 8 It contained an exculpatory clause that
limited the Operator's liability for "its activities under this agreement" to
actions involving gross negligence and willful misconduct.89 There was an
unusual provision incorporated into this JOA providing that the Operator
"agrees to produce and/or conduct operations on the [Contract Area] suf-
ficient to maintain the leases and the unit."90 The Operator had a poor
relationship with his non-operating working interest owners (non-opera-
tors).91 Consequently, when it became apparent that several of the wells
would have to undergo expensive testing and repairs, the Operator was
unable to obtain the consent of some of the non-operators. The JOA for-
bade the Operator from undertaking any project expected to cost more
than $5,000 without consent, except in emergencies. 92 The Operator put
in some of his own money, until he ran out of money. Because the testing
and repairs were not performed, the Texas Railroad Commission sus-
pended production and ordered the well to be plugged,93 and the under-
lying leasehold interest was lost.94 The JOA required the Operator to
offer the well to the non-operators if the Operator elected to abandon or
plug the well, but the Operator made no such offer. 95
Multiple claims were asserted, but this appeal was focused on the dam-
ages awarded to the non-operators by the jury because the Operator
failed to maintain production and failed to offer the well to the non-oper-
ators before it was plugged. The trial court applied the gross negligence
and willful misconduct standard and properly instructed the jury on that
standard. 96
The Texas Supreme Court first considered the applicability of the
JOA's exculpatory clause to adjudicate the breach of contract claims
against the Operator. The exculpatory clause in the 1977 and 1982 Model
Form Operating Agreements limited liability for "all such operations,"
but the 1989 Model Form Operating Agreement limited liability for "ac-
tivities under this agreement." 97 Case law under the earlier forms gener-
ally held that the exculpatory clause applied only to operations on the
Contract Area and not to contract claims.98
87. Id. at 791.
88. Id. at 793 (citing A.A.P.L. Form 610, Model Form Operating Agreement-1989,
American Association of Petroleum Landmen).
89. Id.
90. Reeder v. Wood Cnty. Energy, L.L.C., 320 S.W.3d 433, 446 (Tex. App.-Tyler
2010, pet. granted).
91. Reeder, 395 S.W.3d at 791.
92. Id. at 797.
93. Id. at 791.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 792.
96. Id. at 797.
97. Id. at 794.
98. Id. at 793-94
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The supreme court first noted that some commentary concludes that
the change in language effectively broadened the scope of the exculpa-
tory clause.99 The supreme court also applied its own semantic analysis:
Here, the parties modeled their JOA after the 1989 model form-
recognizing the distinction between "such operations" and "its activi-
ties." The modifier "such" references operations under the JOA,
while the deletion of that word and use of the term "its activities"
includes actions under the JOA that are not limited to operations.100
According to the supreme court, this expanded application of the ex-
culpatory clause meant that the Operator in this case was not liable for
breach of contract unless the Operator's conduct rose to the level of gross
negligence or willful misconduct.101
Applying this standard, the supreme court evaluated the sufficiency of
the evidence for the claims in the case. 102 The supreme court noted that
gross negligence requires that "'the defendant knew about the peril, but
his acts or omissions demonstrate that he did not care." 03 The substance
of the breach of contract claims appeared to be the Operator's failure to
complete testing and repairs that the wells required, and the Operator's
failure to comply with the JOA provision that required him to offer the
well to the non-operators prior to plugging it.104 In regards to the former,
the Operator testified that he sought permission and funding from the
non-operators, but they declined his requests.105 Regarding his failure to
offer the well to the other non-operators, the supreme court noted that
because the Operator was ordered to plug the well, he did not have an
opportunity to offer it to the non-operators.106 Considering this evidence
in the context of the entire record, the supreme court held that there was
no evidence to support a finding of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. 0 7
This case is important because it determined the scope of the exculpa-
tory clause under the 1977, 1982, and 1989 Model Form Operating Agree-
ments and clearly held that the operator's liability under the 1989 form
was significantly less than the operator's liability under the 1977 and 1982
forms.
99. Id. at 794 (citing Robert C. Bledsoe, The Operating Agreement: Matters Not Cov-
ered or Inadequately Covered, 47 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 15.03[1] (2001); Wilson
Woods, Comment, The Effect of Exculpatory Clauses in Joint Operating Agreements: What
Protections Do Operators Really Have in the Oil Patch?, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 211,
214-15 (2005)).
100. Id. at 795.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 795-97.
103. Id. at 796 (quoting Diamond Shamrock Ref. Co. v. Hall, 168 S.W.3d 164, 173 (Tex.
2005)).
104. Id.
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V. LITIGATION
BP America Production Co. v. Marshall08 held that, among cotenants,
the payment of a royalty, rather than a cotenant share, is sufficiently hos-
tile to put the cotenant on notice for adverse possession. The case also
held that the accrual of a cause of action for fraud is not deferred by the
discovery rule and that the statute of limitations for fraud is not tolled by
fraudulent concealment when the alleged fraud could have been discov-
ered with reasonable diligence in Texas Railroad Commission (TRC)
records.109 In the 1970's, BP obtained oil and gas leases on the Slator
Ranch, including a lease from the Marshall family (Marshall) covering 1!
16 of the minerals and a lease from the Vaquillas family (Vaquillas) cov-
ering 1/4 of the minerals. The leases contained common savings clauses
that allowed them to continue beyond the primary term, provided that
BP was engaged in "good-faith drilling or reworking operations designed
to produce paying quantities of oil or gas with no cessation of operations
for more than sixty days." 110 Two weeks before the expiration of the pri-
mary term in July 1980, BP drilled a well. BP continued work on the well
throughout the remainder of the year, but it never achieved production.
The lessors inquired about the status of the well and the leases. BP in-
formed them that it was engaged in continuous operations sufficient to
satisfy the savings clause and keep the leases in effect. The lessors did not
engage in any further inquiries or investigate public records. On March
25, 1981, BP transferred its interest to Sanchez-O'Brien. Sanchez-O'Brien
drilled a productive well in April 1981, and later the leases were assigned
to Wagner."' It was undisputed that all lessees had conducted continu-
ous, good-faith operations since April 1981.
The lawsuit was first filed in 1997. Marshall conceded that Wagner had
acquired the leasehold title by adverse possession and went to trial
against BP on a fraud claim. 'Marshall obtained a favorable jury finding
on fraud, and the issue on appeal was BP's statute of limitations de-
fense. 112 Vaquillas settled with BP and then went to trial against Wagner,
claiming that the title reverted to Vaquillas prior to the assignment of the
lease from BP.113 The issue on appeal was Wagner's adverse possession of
the leasehold title. Thus, notwithstanding the complications of the differ-
108. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. 2011). For other notable
cases dealing with litigation, see Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas) L.P. v. Avinger Timber,
LLC, 386 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2012) (condemnation of gas plant site); Bomar Oil & Gas, Inc.
v. Loyd, 381 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2012, pet. denied) (collateral estoppel
based on division order); May v. Buck, 375 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no. pet.)
(statute of frauds); Conley v. Comstock Oil & Gas, LP, 356 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2011, no pet.) (common law adverse possession and ten-year statute); Teon Mgmt.,
LLC v. Turquoise Bay Corp., 357 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2011, pet. denied)
(trespass to try title for lease termination); XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai, 357 S.W.3d 47
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (estoppel by deed in trespass by try title).
109. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 68-69.
110. Id. at 63.
111. Id. at 64.
112. Id. at 65.
113. Id. at 64.
2013]1 1019
SMU LAW REVIEW
ing positions among the parties, the issues on appeal were (1) whether the
accrual of the cause of action for fraud was deferred by the discovery
rule, and/or whether the statute of limitations was tolled by fraudulent
concealment; and (2) whether Wagner's conduct satisfied the require-
ments for adverse possession. 114
Under the discovery rule, the accrual of a cause of action is deferred
"until the injury could reasonably have been discovered."s 15 The rule is
reserved for injuries that are "inherently undiscoverable," and the evi-
dence of injury is "objectively verifiable."1 1 6 An injury is not inherently
undiscoverable if it can "be discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence."117 Applying these rules, the Texas Supreme Court concluded
that the accrual of the cause of action was not deferred on Marshall's
fraud claim because evidence of BP's failure to maintain the lease was in
the TRC records.118 BP had filed a well log and a plugging report with
the TRC, and these documents were publicly available. If Marshall had
chosen to exercise reasonable diligence, Marshall could have discovered
that BP was not making good-faith efforts to produce. Therefore, the dis-
covery rule did not apply.
In reaching its holding, the supreme court repeated that the discovery
rule is applied categorically and that it is a very limited exception to stat-
utes of limitations.119 It specifically referred to HECI Exploration Co. v.
Neel, a case where it had previously held that the discovery rule would
not apply when the necessary facts were available in public records at the
TRC.120 Thus, it now appears clear that the discovery rule will not apply
to the "category" of cases where the information necessary to discover
the injury is publicly available at the TRC.
Fraudulent concealment is an equitable doctrine that may operate to
extend the limitations period, and unlike the discovery rule, deciding
whether the doctrine applies is a fact-specific inquiry. 121 "A defendant's
fraudulent concealment of wrongdoing may toll the statute of limitations
after the cause of action accrues." 122 There was evidence, which the jury
accepted, that BP concealed its problems on the lease.123 Nevertheless,
the necessary information was also available at the TRC, and because a
lessor is required to exercise due diligence the supreme court held that, as
a matter of law, Marshall would have been able to discover BP's fraud.124
114. Id. at 64-65.
115. Id. at 65 (citing Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455-56
(Tex. 1996).
116. Id. at 65-66 (citing Altai, 918 S.W.2d at 456).
117. Id. at 66 (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734-35 (Tex.
2001)).
118. Id. at 67.
119. Id. at 66-67.
120. Id. at 66 (citing HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998)).
121. Id- at 67.
122. Id. (citing Kerlin v. Sauceda, 263 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Tex. 2008)).
123. Id. at 68.
124. Id. at 69.
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TRC records will now defeat claims of fraudulent concealment if the nec-
essary facts to discover the injury are publicly available.
In Vaquillas's suit against Wagner to regain the leasehold, Wagner ar-
gued that even if the lease had reverted to Vaquillas, Wagner had since
regained the leasehold interest through adverse possession. The dispute
boiled down to whether Wagner's conduct was sufficiently hostile to put
Vaquillas, as cotenant, on notice of Wagner's intent to oust him (ouster as
between cotenants).125
The supreme court noted that when a lease expires the former lessor
becomes an unleased cotenant.126 An unleased cotenant is "entitled to
'the value of the minerals taken less the necessary and reasonable cost of
producing and marketing the same . . . .'"127 In Vaquillas's case, a coten-
ant's share would have entitled Vaquillas to approximately 25% of pro-
duction. Wagner had only paid Vaquillas a royalty interest of 4.23%. The
great disparity between these two amounts, the characterization of the
interest owned, and the payment as a "royalty interest" in various docu-
ments and records (including division orders) was sufficient to put Va-
quillas on notice.128 Accordingly, the supreme court held that Wagner
had adversely acquired the leasehold estate:
By accepting a clearly labeled and computed royalty, Vaquillas was
on notice that Wagner claimed title to the leasehold-an unequivocal
claim to ownership unmistakably inconsistent with and hostile to Va-
quillas's claim of a cotenant relationship. Accordingly, Wagner ac-
quired the same interest it adversely possessed-a leasehold estate
as defined by the original lease.129
The case is significant because it makes clear that TRC records will
generally be sufficient to defeat the application of both the discovery rule
and fraudulent concealment to circumvent the statutes of limitations. Be-
cause the information filed with the TRC is extensive, this will be signifi-
cant in oil and gas cases. The case is also significant because of its holding
that royalty checks are enough to establish cotenant ouster in a lease ter-
mination case. The continuation of payments under a terminated lease
will almost certainly be described as royalty payments. The case empha-
sizes the supreme court's continuing trend of avoiding exceptions to the
statutes of limitation and resisting any finding of an enforceable lease
termination based on claims made long after the date of termination, not-
withstanding that if a lease is a determinable fee.
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co.130 held that the Texas Natural
Resources Code creates private causes of action for breach of the statu-
125. Id.
126. Id. at 70 (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 421-22 (Tex.
2008)).
127. Id. at 71 (quoting Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1965)).
128. Id. at 71-72.
129. Id. at 72 (citing Natural Gas Pipeline Co. Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 199 (Tex.
2003)).
130. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 331 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Tex. 2010).
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tory duties to properly plug wells and to not commit waste, and that sub-
sequent owners do not have standing to sue prior owners for injury to
realty if it occurred before the subsequent owner acquired his interest.
Exxon Corporation (Exxon) held mineral leases subject to a 50% royalty
covering several thousand acres in Refugio County, Texas. During the
1980s, after negotiations to reduce the royalty failed, Exxon systemati-
cally plugged and abandoned its wells because the leases were no longer
profitable. After the leases terminated, Emerald Oil & Gas Company
(Emerald) acquired a portion of the leases and attempted to re-enter the
wells, but it encountered unexpected difficulties. Emerald alleged that
Exxon caused those difficulties by intentionally sabotaging the wells dur-
ing Exxon's plugging and abandonment of the leases. Among other
claims, Emerald sued Exxon for (1) breach of the statutory duty to prop-
erly plug a well, and (2) breach of the statutory duty to not commit
waste. 131
Section 85.321 of the Texas Natural Resources Code provides:
A party who owns an interest in property or production that may be
damaged by another party violating the provisions of this chapter ...
or another law of this state prohibiting waste or a valid rule or order
of the commission may sue for and recover damages and have any
other relief to which he may be entitled at law or in equity.132
The Texas Supreme Court held that the plain language of the statute cre-
ates private causes of action.133
The supreme court next analyzed whether Emerald, as a subsequent
lessee, had standing to maintain suit.13 4 The supreme court explained that
the statute's use of the participle phrase "a party who owns an interest in
property ... may be damaged by another party violating the provisions of
this chapter" could support different interpretations.13 5 This phrase could
support an interpretation that an owner may bring suit only for an injury
concurrent with ownership. This phrase also could support the interpreta-
tion that an owner may bring suit for any past violation or violation con-
current with ownership.
To determine the meaning of the phrase, the supreme court looked to
the statute's predecessor, which preserved common law standards. Com-
mon law provides that:
[A] cause of action for injury to real property accrues when the in-jury is committed. The right to sue is a personal right that belongs to
the person who owns the property at the time of the injury, and the
right to sue does not pass to a subsequent purchaser of the property
unless there is an express assignment of the cause of action.136
131. Id. at 421.
132. Id. at 422 (quoting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.321 (West 2001)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 424.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id. (citation omitted).
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The supreme court clarified some confusion that originated in its prior,
withdrawn opinion by explaining that its holding was not intended to
mean that only Exxon could sue Exxon. The royalty owners could have
standing to sue and actually did sue, but they were too late in this case.' 3 7
The supreme court also deleted from its withdrawn opinion the holding
that Exxon's actions did not constitute waste. Given that the court con-
cluded Emerald had no standing on the plugging claim, it must have con-
cluded that no standing on the waste claim was sufficient for its holding,
without reaching the question of whether Exxon's actions did or did not
constitute waste. 138
The significance of the case is the unequivocal holding that the Texas
Natural Resources Code creates a private cause of action for damages
resulting from statutory violations. In dictum, the supreme court also rec-
ognized that there is a statutory defense to such civil claims based on the
reasonably prudent operator standard.139 The holding that a subsequent
owner lacks standing to sue for pre-existing damages to realty, absent an
express assignment of the cause of action, 140 is consistent with long-stand-
ing precedent.
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co.141 held that false filings with
the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) will generally not support private
causes of action for fraud. This case was the culmination of almost fif-
teen years of litigation between royalty owners and their lessee, based on
disputes arising under leases granted in the 1950s. The leases covered sev-
eral thousand acres and included a 50% royalty clause and a stringent
well data disclosure clause.142 The leases also required the lessee and suc-
cessor lessees (collectively, Exxon) to fully develop the field by drilling
and completing at least one well in each horizon capable of producing in
paying quantities and to operate the tract in a way that realized the full
value of the leased premises.143 During the term of the leases, Exxon
drilled 121 wells and produced at least fifteen million barrels of oil and
more than sixty-five billion cubic feet of gas, resulting in the payment of
more than $43 million in royalties. As the field began to decline, Exxon
sought to amend the leases and reduce the royalty.144 The royalty owners
refused, and negotiations continued for years, increasing in intensity as
Exxon's threat to plug and abandon became more imminent. The royalty
owners identified other oil companies interested in taking over the leases
and urged Exxon to sell or transfer its interest to some other company.
137. Id. at 425 n.4; see Exxon Corp. v. Miesch, No. 13-00-00104-cy, 2012 WL 4854726
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Oct. 11, 2012) (mem. op.).
138. See Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., No. 05-0729, 2009 WL 795760 (Tex.
Mar. 27, 2009), opinion withdrawn and superseded by, 331 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2010).
139. Exxon Corp., 331 S.W.3d at 422.
140. Id. at 425.
141. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. 2011).
142. Id. at 199.
143. Id. at 210.
144. Id. at 199.
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Because Exxon determined that the leases were no longer profitable, it
finally began plugging wells in 1989. The royalty owners threatened to sue
Exxon in August of 1990 if Exxon plugged any wells that were capable of
producing in paying quantities. The royalty owners threatened to sue
under the lease contracts and under the common law doctrine of waste.
As Exxon plugged the wells, it disclosed the plugging methods for each
well in a plugging report on Form W-3 filed with the TRC.145 The filing
requires that the operator disclose the specific methods used to plug the
wells and sign an oath verifying that the statements in the report are
true. 146 Exxon pursued the plugging project until its completion in 1991,
despite objections from the royalty owners and offers from potential
buyers. 147
In 1993, after the leases had terminated, the royalty owners leased part
of the lands originally included in Exxon's leases to Pace West Produc-
tion, Ltd. (Pace), later known as Emerald Oil & Gas Company, L.C.
(Emerald). In deciding whether to lease, Emerald reviewed Exxon's pub-
licly filed plugging reports. The filings seemed to indicate that Exxon had
properly plugged the wells, but when Emerald attempted to reopen the
plugged wells in 1994, Emerald's attempts proved futile because it en-
countered junk in the holes. In a 1994 written report to the royalty own-
ers, Emerald indicated that Exxon had cut casings while plugging the
wells and that Emerald found junk in the wells.148 In January 1995, Emer-
ald obtained Exxon's internal well records on the plugged wells from an-
other party on an adjoining tract and discovered that Exxon's internal
records differed substantially from the records filed with the TRC. Con-
cluding that Exxon intentionally sabotaged the field, Emerald sued Ex-
xon in July of 1996, and the royalty owners intervened in August and
September of 1996.
The trial court severed the plaintiffs' negligence per se claim and claims
based on the statutory duties to properly plug the wells and to avoid com-
mitting waste. 149 The statutory claims and the issues on private causes of
action and standing were resolved in the companion case also styled Ex-
xon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co. 5 0
All of the tort claims asserted and appealed in this case that were sub-
ject to a two-year statute of limitations were held to be barred by limita-
tions.151 The remainder of the opinion focused on two things: (1) the
alleged fraud in the Form W-3s that were filed with the TRC, and (2) the
145. Id. at 200.
146. Id. at 200 n.3 (citing 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14 (West 2013)).
147. Id. at 200.
148. Id. at 201.
149. Id.
150. See Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 331 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2010).
151. Exxon Corp., 348 S.W.3d at 202-03. The royalty owners had knowledge of the
alleged injuries caused by early abandonment no later than the 1990 letter threatening to
sue Exxon, and the royalty owners and Emerald had actual knowledge of the alleged inju-
ries to the wellbores no later than June 1994 or more than two years before suit was filed as
to both sets of claims. Id. at 206.
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royalty owners' claim that Exxon breached the development clauses in
the leases. 152
Regarding plaintiffs' claim of fraud based on the Form W-3s filed with
the TRC, Exxon did not dispute that it plugged at least some of the wells
using non-standard plugging procedures.153 It admitted to cutting the well
casing and leaving it in the wellbore. Emerald and the royalty owners
claimed that Exxon injured them by making material misrepresentations
on its plugging reports, upon which the plaintiffs justifiably relied. 154
However, to prevail on their claim of fraud, the plaintiffs also had to
demonstrate that Exxon "made the representation with the intent that
the other party would act on that representation or intended to induce
the party's reliance on the representation."155
The TRC rules provide that "'[n]on-drillable material that would ham-
per or prevent re-entry of a well shall not be placed in any wellbore dur-
ing plugging operations. . . . Pipe and unretrievable junk shall not be
cemented in the hole during plugging operations without prior approval
by the district director .. . "156 Exxon obviously did not comply with this
rule. Exxon nevertheless claimed that it could not have anticipated that
the plugging reports it filed would impact future operators because the
reporting requirements were intended to protect against pollution and
are not intended to provide notice to future operators.'57 The Texas Su-
preme Court rejected Exxon's argument based on the TRC's stated
objectives for the reporting requirements, which included: (1) protecting
the environment and (2) allowing "re-entry into the wells for commercial
purposes." 58
Although the supreme court accepted Emerald's argument that false
information in the plugging records could reasonably induce detrimental
reliance, the supreme court stated that this alone did not establish that
Exxon intended to induce the plaintiffs' reliance.159 Rather, the plaintiffs
were required to show that "'[t]he maker of the misrepresentation [has]
information that would lead a reasonable man to conclude that there is
an especial likelihood that it will reach those persons and will influence
their conduct."' 160 This is a specific, focused inquiry. Reliance on public
information gathered as part of a general industry practice, even if it
turns out to be false, is insufficient as a matter of law.161 The inquiry "is
not satisfied by evidence that a misrepresentation may be read in the fu-
152. Id. at 216-17.
153. Id. at 200 n.5.
154. Id. at 206.
155. Id. at 217 (citing DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex. 1990)).




160. Id. at 219 (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 531 cmt. d (1977)).




ture by some unknown member of the public or of a specific industry." 162
The supreme court found that Pace's earlier attempts to acquire the wells
and Emerald and the royalty owners' attempts to stop Exxon's plugging
could be evidence of fraud.163 Additionally, there were fact issues regard-
ing intent, such as whether Pace and Emerald were effectively the same
entity and whether the W-3s were actually inaccurate. Because of these
issues, the supreme court reversed the trial court's directed verdict for
Exxon and remanded that issue to the trial court.164
The leases with Exxon contained a development clause that required
Exxon to fully develop the leased tracts.165 The tracts were deemed "fully
developed" when "at least one (1) well has been drilled and completed in
each horizon or stratum capable of producing oil or sulphur in paying
quantities for each twenty (20) acres of said tract." 166 As required by the
lease, Exxon generally drilled the required number of wells.167 However,
the royalty owners claimed that Exxon did not "complete" two produc-
tive zones because it failed to exploit the full potential of the tracts. Also,
the royalty owners claimed that, because Article 4 of the leases required
Exxon to realize the "full value" of the tract, Exxon was required to drill
more than the single well specified for each horizon when the land could
be further developed before it could abandon the leases.
Because Article 3 specified the number of wells required to fully de-
velop the land, the supreme court held that Article 3 established and lim-
ited Exxon's duty.168 "Where the Lease expressly defines the duty, we
will not impose a more stringent obligation unless it is clear that the par-
ties intended to warrant production beyond that defined obligation."1 6 9
The supreme court held that under this particular lease (with its express
development clause) and in the absence of an express clause defining
"drilled and completed," for a well to be drilled and completed "a hole
must be bored in the ground, and if oil or gas in paying quantities is en-
countered, the casing must be perforated or otherwise prepared for pro-
duction."170 The supreme court also noted that "completed" meant
capable of producing oil or gas, without a requirement that it be actually
producing or ever produce, and that by contract parties may agree that a
well is completed even though it is a dry hole.171 Because Exxon drilled
the required number of wells and produced in paying quantities from the
two contested zones, the supreme court held that Exxon did not breach
the leases, even though it did not fully exploit the zones' potential.172
162. Id.
163. Id. at 219-20.
164. Id. at 221.
165. Id. at 210.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 213.
168. Id. at 214.
169. Id. at 215.
170. Id. at 212.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 216.
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Exxon was not liable for breaching the development clause of the
leases. 73
The significance of the case is the supreme court's holding that false
filings with the TRC did not support private causes of action based on
fraud, except in very narrow circumstances.174 A plaintiff must show that
the party making the false filing has information that would lead a rea-
sonable person to conclude that there is an especial likelihood that it will
reach those persons and influence their conduct. The fact that the infor-
mation may influence some unknown person, or the fact that the industry
generally relies upon such filings, is not enough. The case also provides a
definition of "drill and complete," which at least under this lease is con-
strued to mean to drill and perforate the hole or otherwise prepare for
production. The contention that "complete" means to fully develop, when
used in the context of this case, was rejected. Finally, the plaintiffs' loss
on all the two-year tort claims based on limitations suggests that land-
owners should be more aggressive about filing suit or seeking tolling
agreements, regardless of the status of on-going lease negotiations.
VI. REGULATION
Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas
LLC175 held that the grant of a T-4 permit to a pipeline company by the
Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) did not conclusively establish the
company's status as a common carrier and confer on the company the
power of eminent domain. The company seeking to exercise the power of
eminent domain has the burden of establishing that it is a common car-
rier. Texas Rice refused Denbury Green access to Texas Rice's property
to survey the proposed location of a carbon dioxide pipeline. Denbury
Green filed suit claiming it was a common carrier and requested a perma-
nent injunction preventing Texas Rice from denying it access to the prop-
erty.176 Denbury Green prevailed on summary judgment, primarily based
on the T-4 permit granted by the TRC.177 The principal issue was
whether a landowner can challenge in court the eminent domain power of
a pipeline company holding a common carrier permit to operate a pipe-
line issued by the TRC.
The Texas Supreme Court began its review by analyzing Section
111.002(6) of the Texas Natural Resources Code, which states that a per-
son is a common carrier if he:
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC, 363 S.W.3d
192, 204 (Tex. 2012). For other notable cases dealing with regulation, see R.R. Comm'n of
Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2011) (TRC
injection well permitting process); W. Ref. Inc. v. FERC, 636 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2011)
(FERC jurisdiction over oil pipelines); Allegiance Hillview, L.P. v. Range Tex. Prod., LLC,
347 S.W.3d 855 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (city permitting of well site).
176. Tex. Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 196.
177. Id. at 196, 203-04.
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"owns, operates, or manages, wholly or partially, pipelines for the
transportation of carbon dioxide .... to or for the public for hire, but
only if such person files with the commission a written acceptance of
the provisions of this chapter expressly agreeing that, in considera-
tion of the rights acquired, it becomes a common carrier subject to
the duties and obligations conferred or imposed by this chapter."178
A common carrier, as defined by the Texas Natural Resources Code,
has the "'right and power of eminent domain.""179 The supreme court
noted that "[w]hile these provisions plainly give private pipeline compa-
nies the power of eminent domain, that authority is subject to special
scrutiny by the courts" because Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Consti-
tution "'prohibits the taking of property for private use." 80
The supreme court reviewed the TRC's administrative process in grant-
ing an applicant common carrier status and found that it did not include
any inquiry or adjudication as to whether the pipeline would be used for
public or private purposes.181
Apparently, in order to receive a common-carrier permit, the appli-
cant need only place an "x" in a box indicating that the pipeline will
be operated as a common carrier, and to agree under Section
111.002(6) to subject itself to "duties and obligations conferred or
imposed" by Chapter 111. Under these minimal requirements,
Denbury Green reported itself as a common carrier and obtained a
permit a few days later. 8 2
"Private property cannot be imperiled with such nonchalance, via an ir-
refutable presumption created by checking a certain box on a one-page
government form."183 The supreme court held "that the T-4 permit alone
did not conclusively establish Denbury Green's status as a common car-
rier and confer the power of eminent domain."1 84 "[A] permit granting
common-carrier status is prima facie valid. But once a landowner chal-
lenges that status, the burden falls upon the pipeline company to establish
its common-carrier bona fides if it wishes to exercise the power of emi-
nent domain."' 85
The supreme court rejected Denbury Green's argument that making
the pipeline available for public use was sufficient to establish common
carrier status.
[T]o qualify as a common carrier under Section 111.002(6), a reason-
able probability must exist that the pipeline will at some point after
construction serve the public by transporting gas for one or more
customers who will either retain ownership of their gas or sell it to
178. Id. at 197 (ellipses in original) (quoting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002(6)
(West 2006)).
179. Id. (quoting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(b)).
180. Id. (quoting Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1962)).
181. Id. at 199-201.
182. Id. at 199.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 198.
185. Id. at 202.
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parties other than the carrier.186
There was some evidence that Denbury Green intended to fully utilize
the pipeline for its own purposes, and therefore, Denbury Green did not
establish common carrier status as a matter of law.187
The significance of this case is the supreme court's holding that the T-
4 permit issued by the TRC is prima facie valid, but when a landowner
challenges the company's right to exercise the power of eminent domain,
the pipeline company has the burden to establish that it is a common
carrier. The pipeline must be for a public use and not just for a private
use. 188
FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems, L.C.189 held
that subsurface wastewater migration can constitute a trespass at com-
mon law. FPL Farming Ltd. (FPL) owned land adjacent to land on which
Environmental Processing Systems, L.C. (EPS) was operating a deep
wastewater injection well under permits issued by the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). FPL filed this suit against EPS claim-
ing trespass because the wastewater being injected was naturally migrat-
ing into FPL's land. After the jury found that no trespass occurred, and
the trial judge entered a take-nothing judgment against FPL, FPL ap-
pealed. The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis that the
TCEQ permits shielded EPS from tort liability, but the Texas Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a TCEQ permit did not shield a tortfeasor
from civil liability and remanded this case back to the court of appeals for
consideration of all issues raised by the parties related to the alleged tres-
pass. 190 The supreme court did not decide whether subsurface wastewater
migration can constitute a trespass or whether it did in this case.191
The most important issue on appeal was whether a cause of action ex-
ists for trespass for subsurface wastewater migration. First, the supreme
court held that FPL, as the owner of the surface, had a possessory interest
and ownership interest in the briny water below its tracts sufficient to
establish standing to sue for trespass.192 The supreme court then noted
that Texas case law and the Texas Legislature have recognized that a sur-
face owner has a property interest in the water (both fresh and salt water)
in place below the surface.193 The supreme court also noted, as this law-
suit demonstrates, that the subsurface levels have economic value for
186. Id. (footnotes omitted).
187. Id. at 204.
188. Id.
189. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 383 S.W.3d 274, 277-78 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2012, pet. pending).
190. Id. at 278-79; FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306,
308 (Tex. 2011).
191. FPL Farming Ltd., 351 S.W.3d at 314-15.
192. FPL Farming Ltd., 383 S.W.3d at 279-80.
193. Id. at 280 (citing TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.001, 36.002 (West Supp. 2011));
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 832 (Tex. 2012); Robinson v. Robbins
Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973)).
2013]1 1029
SMU LAW REVIEW
storing waste.194 Further, the Texas Legislature had not given FPL, as an
adjacent property owner, the right to pool its affected property with other
adjoining landowners in order to capitalize on the commercial storage
value of the subsurface levels. Without a trespass remedy, FPL would be
unable to protect its commercial interest in its property. The supreme
court concluded that FPL had a cause of action for trespass at common
law.195
The supreme court recognized that it was not constrained to follow the
law applicable to surface trespass cases in resolving a subsurface tres-
pass.196 Nevertheless, the supreme court followed the prior opinions of
seven Texas appellate courts in surface trespass cases and held that the
burden of consent in a trespass action rests on the alleged trespasser.' 97
The supreme court reasoned that the burden should be placed upon the
alleged trespasser based on: "(1) the comparative likelihood that a certain
situation may occur in a reasonable percentage of cases; and (2) the diffi-
culty in proving a negative."1 98 After finding that the jury instruction er-
roneously placed the burden of proof on the question of consent on FPL,
the supreme court held the error was harmful and remanded for a new
trial.199
This case is important because it establishes a precedent for a cause of
action for trespass based on subsurface wastewater migration, even when
the injection is permitted by the TCEQ on adjacent lands.
VII. CONCLUSION
The oil and gas industry routinely operates within two separate uni-
verses: (1) title and property rights, which are determined by conveyances
and contracts interpreted by the courts; and (2) rights to produce, which
are determined by statutes and regulations enforced by regulatory agen-
cies. Nevertheless, the boundaries between those separate universes are
not always distinct, and litigants may find that what has transpired in one
universe may have an effect on the parallel universe. During this report-
ing period, perhaps the most important trend has been that courts have
resolved some of those overlaps in a way that will limit future litigation.
The Texas Railroad Commission maintains voluminous public records.
No authority holds that these documents provide notice or constructive
notice affecting the chain of title found in the county records. It is now
clear, however, that the duty of reasonable diligence requires that prop-
erty owners must make themselves aware of relevant information availa-
ble in the public records at the Texas Railroad Commission because the
information in those records may be used to defeat the application of
194. Id. at 281.
195. Id. at 282.
196. Id. (citing Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.
2008)).
197. Id. at 283-84.
198. Id. at 283.
199. Id. at 289.
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both the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment as doctrines by which
the statute of limitations may be circumvented. Because so much infor-
mation is available in the Commission records, this will be significant in
many oil and gas cases. The recent cases are the culmination of a very
pronounced trend to limit the number of stale claims that can be litigated.
The regulatory universe will make it very hard to avoid a defense of limi-
tations in the universe of conveyance and contract disputes.
Further, plaintiffs seeking to use Texas Railroad Commission filings to
create causes of action have had limited success. For example, the report-
ing requirements create a private cause of action for fraud based on statu-
tory violations, such as the statutory duties to properly plug wells and to
not commit waste. Nevertheless, false filings will generally not support
private causes of action for fraud because the plaintiff must show that the
party making the false filing had information that would lead a reasona-
ble person to conclude that there was an especial likelihood that the false
filing will reach the plaintiff and will influence the plaintiff's conduct. It is
not enough that the information may influence some unknown person or
that the industry generally relies upon such filings. Plaintiffs will have a
very difficult time meeting this burden. There is also a statutory defense
to such civil claims based on the reasonably prudent operator standard.
Finally, the cause of action for fraud resulting in injury to realty is seri-
ously limited because subsequent owners do not have standing to sue
prior owners for injury to realty that occurred before the subsequent
owner acquired his interest.
In the universe of title and property rights, operating agreements were
closely reviewed. The holding that lessors are not third-party benefi-
ciaries of an operating agreement closed the door on a potential firestorm
of additional litigation. The decision on the scope of the exculpatory
clause in the model form operating agreements limits the operator's lia-
bility under the 1989 form but apparently accepts the earlier lower court
decisions finding that the exculpatory clause did not limit the operator's
liability as to contract claims.
The holding that continuing to pay royalty under a terminated lease
will serve as notice of adverse possession to the cotenant/former lessor as
to the reversionary estate will limit the number of lease termination
cases. It is very common for royalty payments to continue after lease ter-
mination because one or both parties are unaware of the termination.
There is now authority for the proposition that a regulatory permit for
an oil and gas operation will not shield the operator from civil liability for
the permitted conduct, and permitted conduct can nevertheless be the
basis for subsurface trespass. The regulatory process for granting an ap-
plicant common carrier status will not conclusively establish that status
and thus confer the power of eminent domain. These holdings generally
preserve the concept of two separate universes.
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In summary, if there is any unifying trend, it is that many of the re-
ported decisions have been resolved in a way that is likely to limit future
litigation.
